Appeal Bond: A Jurisdictional Requirement in Every Summary or Ordinary Eviction Case

Ljubinka Markovic v. John J. Meldon y Diana B. Fitzgerald, 2025 TSPR 99

In its recent opinion, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico determined that, as a general rule, it is necessary to require an appeal bond in every eviction case, regardless of whether it is of a summary or ordinary nature. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals after determining that the deposit of the rent owed before the First Instance Court had the same effect as posting the bond, which satisfied the jurisdiction requirement for the appeal.

The names of the parties suggest a legal battle with European overtones—between Serbia and England—given the origins of their surnames. However, the dispute concerns a residence located on Calle Sol in Old San Juan, due to the alleged nonpayment of rent. In a succinct complaint, relying on the Code of Civil Procedure of 1933—a statute that many believed to be long deceased due to its longevity and frequent mentions of repeal—Markovic sued the Meldon-Fitzgeralds, whom she described as “wealthy individuals who moved to Puerto Rico to obtain tax benefits under Acts No. 20 and 22 of 2012”, laws that are intended to promote the export of services and attract investors by granting them exemptions on capital gains. The Meldon-Fitzgeralds argued that the rent was annual, not monthly, and that Markovic breached her contractual obligation to sell them the property even though they exercised the purchase option.

What began in May 2021 as a summary eviction, and collection of monies action, took the long road to justice without reaching a summary conclusion, converting into an ordinary proceeding. After both parties filed motions for summary judgment, the Court of First Instance concluded that the Meldon-Fitzgeralds did not exercise their option to purchase within the corresponding term and that eviction was appropriate.

Dissatisfied, and having deposited before the Court of First Instance the (annual) rent payments owed, the Meldon-Fitzgeralds appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging error in the interpretation of the contract and in concluding that their notice of exercising the purchase option was untimely. A new controversy then arose when the Court of Appeals required the Meldon-Fitzgeralds to explain why the appeal should not be dismissed, since the Court of First Instance had not required an appeal bond, which is usually imposed in eviction cases. Contrary to the Meldon-Fitzgeralds’ position, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that it had been filed prematurely because the Court First Instance had neither set the amount of the appeal bond nor approved an exemption from it—requirements the appellate court considered jurisdictional in every eviction case.

Facing this second setback, the Meldon-Fitzgeralds turned to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring itself without jurisdiction by applying the appeal bond requirement from the Code of Civil Procedure of 1933 for summary eviction proceedings to a case that was being processed as an ordinary one.

After discussing the jurisdiction of the courts and the Code of Civil Procedure of 1933 as the legal source governing eviction procedures—both summary and ordinary—the Supreme Court went on to address the controversy regarding the requirement of an appeal bond in all eviction cases as a duty of the Court of First Instance established under Article 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1933. This step, the Court emphasized, is a prerequisite to filing an appeal. The Court noted that an appeal is only perfected if the defendant posts a bond for the amount set by the trial court within 5 days as required by Article 629 of the Code. The Court also explained that Article 631 provides that, when the eviction action is based on non-payment, it shall be the duty of the defendant to deposit with the Clerk of the Court of First Instance the amount of each and every rent amount that is due or to provide a bond, to the satisfaction of the Court. The Supreme Court emphasized that the bond does not exist solely to guarantee payment of rent but also to cover any damage resulting from freezing the owner’s use of the property while the appeal is pending.

The Court concluded that, since the Meldon-Fitzgeralds had deposited the amount of each rental due in the Court of First Instance, it was not appropriate to require them to pay the bond on appeal. The Court determined that depositing the rent payments owed before the Court of First Instance has the same effect as providing a bond because it guarantees payment of all rent owed and protects the property owner’s interests while the property remains tied up in litigation. The case will return to the Court of Appeals to address the appeal filed by the Meldon-Fitzgeralds.